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Data containers enable users to control access to their data while un-
trusted applications compute on it. However, they require replicating an ap-
plication inside each container compromising functionality, programmability,
and performance.
We propose DATS — a system to run web applications that retains
application usability and efficiency through a mix of hardware capability en-
hanced containers and the introduction of two new primitives modeled after
the popular model-view-controller (MVC) pattern. (1) DATS introduces a
templating language to create views that compose data across data containers.
(2) DATS uses authenticated storage and confinement to enable an untrusted
storage service, such as memcached and deduplication, to operate on plain-
text data across containers. These two primitives act as robust declassifiers
that allow DATS to enforce non-interference across containers, taking large
applications out of the trusted computing base (TCB).
iv
We showcase eight different web applications including Gitlab and a
Slack-like chat, significantly improve the worst-case overheads due to applica-
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Web applications have to implement a wide array of security features,
such as input sanitization, authorization, and access control checks [1]. This
burden often causes developers to implement these features incorrectly [2, 3]
or fail to update vulnerable libraries promptly [4], making web applications
particularly susceptible to “zero-day” vulnerabilities [5]. A compromised web
application can then exfiltrate data to unauthorized users and cause large data
breaches. Moreover, the threat of exploits forces considerable penetration-
testing and compliance-certification work that slows down application devel-
opment.
Ideally, users and enterprises would store their data on storage plat-
forms (e.g. Google Drive or electronic medical record (EMR) systems), use
untrusted web applications that integrate with these storage platforms, and
still protect their data from being breached — i.e. enforcing mandatory access
1Casen Hunger, Llùıs Vilanova, Charalampos Papamanthou, Yoav Etsion, and Mohit
Tiwari. DATS – data containers for web applications. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third
International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operat-
ing Systems, ASPLOS ’18, pages 722-736, New York, NY, USA, 2018. ACM. The author’s
contributions include assisting with the research design, writing software, performing exper-
iments, and writing of the publication.
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control (MAC) over the untrusted applications. Figure 1.1 shows a simplified
setting where a doctor (Dave) shares folders with patients Alice, Bob, and Eve
and uses untrusted applications for messaging and scheduling.
A natural defense strategy is to use data containers : run an entire
application instance within the context of each data object, with each instance
isolated into a separate container [6–9]. The access control rules will hold by
definition even if an application instance is compromised or malicious (no
information can be transferred across containers for different data objects).
One could use language-level information flow control (IFC) to achieve the
same goals (e.g. Hails [10] provides a Haskell framework that attaches labels to
data in database models), but this compromises programmability. Developers
rely on large bodies of existing frameworks and languages, therefore we cannot
limit them to only using vetted options. The advantage of most OS container
technologies is that they can isolate unmodified code.
Data containers raise two new challenges. Usability: for example, a
calendar application cannot aggregate the information from appointments in
different data objects into a single page. Efficiency: applications cannot use
a single storage service, like deduplication, across data objects.
In this paper we present the DATS system, which refactors authentica-
tion and access controls outside of untrusted web applications. DATS couples
data containers along with two new robust declassification [11] mechanisms in a
novel way to trivially enforce access controls at the container level. It leverages
















































Figure 1.1: Current systems have application-centric access controls (top) and
cannot prevent data leaks; e.g. a compromised or malicious “Scheduling” application
can leak Alice’s events to Eve (from “ Fracture” to “ Flu”). Data-centric access
controls (bottom) enforce users’ ACLs on all applications: data is confined to its
respective label.
3
programmability by presenting a familiar programming model to developers
and supporting several existing web application languages and frameworks.
First, DATS recovers usability by securely composing views from multi-
ple data objects. Applications can provide an untrusted view template to
a trusted template declassifier to aggregate information from each per-data ob-
ject container into a single page, like in many templating languages [12]. The
declassifier transparently applies language level IFC to prevent information
leaks across data objects.
Second, DATS improves efficiency by securely sharing untrusted stor-
age services across data objects. Applications can use a trusted storage de-
classifier that interposes between applications and untrusted shared models
(e.g. for deduplication, key-values stores, compression, etc.). The declassifier
performs integrity checks on each data read operation (i.e. “get(keyx)”) to
ensure that it only returns the value from the most recent “put(keyx, val)”
operation on the same data object – interestingly, we use this to ensure that
storage does not leak information across data objects.
Container technologies are available in production systems, but repli-
cating an application per data object has intrinsic inefficiencies known as
multi-execution [13]. Performance is largely secondary for enterprises (they
have far fewer users than internet-scale services), but multi-execution can
become problematic when operating across a large number of data objects
(e.g. search). Therefore, we explore using hardware-assisted thread contain-
ers to avoid multi-execution.
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DATS and the client browser are the only components that reside in
the TCB, while ensuring applications remain programmable, usable, and ef-
ficient. IFC efforts like Hails [10] and Jeeves [14] are instead a great fit to
the trusted developers of DATS’s TCB. Enterprises can then leverage the vast
space of existing and untrusted web applications, frameworks, languages, and
developers while at the same time avoid costly application code audits. We
make the following contributions:
• We introduce DATS, a programming model that enables web services to
be run in data containers. DATS uses two new robust declassifiers to
retain functionality and OS-level multi-execution to minimize constraints
on programmers (Chapters 3 and 4).
• We evaluate programmability and security by developing 4 applications
and porting 4 existing ones (Chapters 5 and 6).
• We compare performance with existing OS-level containers [15, 16] and




Many enterprises, like hospitals, use web-based applications for security-
sensitive data. Currently, the TCB includes every application since an application-
level exploit can put all data at risk. Such applications are thus built, certified,
and audited for security first, with performance being a secondary concern [19].
This accrues large costs from highly skilled, security-aware programmers and
requires arduous penetration-testing and compliance-certification work before
the smallest changes can be pushed into production. This is clearly at odds
with rapid application development and deployment cycles and cost-efficiency;
one cannot employ the vast majority of existing web developers, who are not
security-savvy, nor leverage existing applications and development frameworks.
We therefore need a systematic approach to provide security and cost-efficiency
for such security-sensitive applications.
Figure 1.1 shows a simplified setting where a doctor (Dave) shares fold-
1Casen Hunger, Llùıs Vilanova, Charalampos Papamanthou, Yoav Etsion, and Mohit
Tiwari. DATS – data containers for web applications. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third
International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operat-
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contributions include assisting with the research design, writing software, performing exper-
iments, and writing of the publication.
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ers (i.e. access control domains or security labels) with patients Alice, Bob,
and Eve and uses untrusted applications like “Messaging” and “Scheduling”.
Access control lists (ACLs) provide users a simple and intuitive way to express
data confidentiality expectations for many applications; e.g. Dave explicitly
decides to share folder “Fracture ” with Alice in Figure 1.1. Our “folders” are
the “control domains” in security literature, and folder ACLs serve as security
labels for the data inside folders.
Existing systems provide application-centric policies (top of Figure 1.1);
they can isolate applications from each other, but a compromised application
can access data from multiple access control domains, even if users correctly
set their folders’ ACLs. For example, a buggy or malicious “Scheduling” ap-
plication can store events intended for folder “Fracture ” into “Flu ” when
processing Dave’s appointments. Even if all applications restrict Eve to only
access “Flu ”, this folder now contains events exfiltrated from “Fracture ”.
In the worst case, data from all folders could be exfiltrated, violating all user
confidentiality expectations. Instead, a data-centric MAC policy (bottom of
Figure 1.1) provides an intuitive alternative, where data from different folders
cannot interfere with each other.
In this section, we describe the challenges in enforcing data-centric
MAC over untrusted applications, and the opportunity inherent in the struc-




Our threat model for web applications has the client browser and the
server-side platform (i.e. the hardware, hypervisor, OS, and DATS’s core
components) as part of the TCB. The applications, their libraries, and storage
services (e.g. key-value stores) are hosted on the platform but are outside
the TCB; this also includes application code running on the client’s browser
(e.g. using JavaScript). DATS aims to prevent the following attacks by
refactoring authorization and access control out of the untrusted components:
Code-driven folder interference. Untrusted code and developers
are considered an attacking subject — either directly through malicious inten-
tion or indirectly through buggy code — and must not be able to leak data
across any two folders (or arbitrary internet addresses). In information flow
terms, the user’s requirement is non-interference [20] across folders.
User-driven folder interference. Users (authorized or not) are
considered an attacking subject and must be prevented from violating non-
interference across unauthorized folders. This includes exploiting untrusted
code through memory errors, malicious inputs, etc. or running arbitrary code
to access unauthorized folders.
We otherwise consider authorized users trusted; they fully delegate
trust in handling sensitive data to other users with whom they share folders.
We do not protect against poor judgment when sharing a sensitive file with
another user, who is free to manually communicate its contents to another
8
authorized folder or anywhere else.
We limit the scope of our problem and list complementary tech-
niques to handle other risks to user data:
• Integrity: We do not prevent untrusted applications from mangling user
data or destroying it. Systems such as Frientegrity [21] handle it orthog-
onally.
• Information leaks via timing or termination channels: We assume tech-
niques that either normalize (e.g. deterministic execution [22] or pre-
dictive mitigation [23]) or randomize (e.g. fuzzing [24]) the timing
of outputs (e.g. on a storage→app channel, possibly with behav-
ioral/anomaly detection for termination channels).
• Privacy-preserving data mixing: Cross-folder functionality such as ana-
lytics (e.g. clustering or training classifiers) fundamentally violates the
access control policies set by users. Complementary approaches such as
differential privacy [25–29] or quasi-identifier based privacy [30–32] show
that this functionality can directly integrate with DATS: the functions
can be executed in isolation and only their perturbed output released
(e.g. GUPT [27]). Similar declassifiers can be built for advertisement
impressions [33] and for sending debugging output [34] back to develop-
ers.
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2.2 Challenges in Enforcing Data-Centric MAC
OS-level MAC. The simplest way to enforce data-centric MAC is to run
an application process per folder inside an OS-level container using LinuX
Containers [15], SELinux MAC [16], capabilities [35], or OS-level IFC (OS-
IFC) [6, 8, 9, 36].
This approach curtails crucial functionality. It cannot support web
pages that display data from multiple folders (i.e. cross-folder views), since
the application has limited access to a single folder. For example, Dave will
need to open each per-folder “Scheduling” application to manually find a free
slot for a meeting, a tedious and error-prone operation.
A per-folder application instance can also be inefficient, since a single
MVC model cannot optimize storage across folders. For example, data dedu-
plication has to work across all folders in order to find unencrypted data to
consolidate. Storage services such as in-memory key-value stores (e.g. Re-
dis, memcached) or distributed coding also work across folders and will be
inefficient if we run a separate instance on each folder. Furthermore, run-
ning multiple instances of an application can sometimes lead to poor resource
utilization in the micro-architecture (i.e. multi-execution [13]).
PL-level MAC. Programming-language (PL) level IFC [10,37, 38] can con-
trol the flow and aggregation of information inside an application (such as
creating cross-folder views) and enforce data-centric MAC policies. However,
it requires careful annotation of program inputs, intermediate variables, and
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outputs to ensure information does not flow between inputs and outputs with
incompatible ACLs. This makes PL-MAC notoriously complex to use in prac-
tice, requires developers to have extensive security expertise, and constrains
them to specific programming frameworks. Further, PL-MAC only works as
long as application developers are trusted [37] or when the trusted platform
developers maintain the data model for all third-party applications [10].
Finally, optimizations, such as deduplication, cannot be represented in
a PL-MAC solution, since it compares data across folders and executes code
based on this comparison.
2.3 Opportunities in MVC Applications
MVC frameworks are popular in web applications and require devel-
opers to write separate components and strict interfaces between views and
controllers as well as controllers and models. We can use these interfaces to
transparently enforce data-centric MAC over the entire web application.
Views in MVC applications separate presentation from application
logic using templating languages. These languages are meant to arrange data
in different ways instead of creating new information from data. This allows
us to impose PL-level MAC without being undermined by pointers, reflection,
and other features of full-featured languages.
Model (i.e. storage) optimizations implement diverse functionality in
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Figure 2.1: Example web page flow from a user (“client-side”), DATS’s main com-
ponents, and an application’s app-template-storage components (and their relation
to MVC). Application code, application data, and storage services are untrusted
(grayed areas and colored boxes), while DATS’s trusted components (boxes with white
background) enforce folder non-interference. Application components run inside OS-
level containers, which can very easily enforce per-folder MAC policies. Note that
the client’s browser is allowed to run untrusted application code (e.g. JavaScript).
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more, several popular and complex web services expose variants of a simple
put-get interface: deduplication, in-memory key-value stores (memcached),
and cloud-based storage services such as Amazon S3 and Google Drive. Inter-
posing a transparent integrity-checking proxy on this common interface enables
untrusted services to work with plain-text data. This is essential for services
like deduplication (that will not work if data is encrypted) and allows services
to compress, index, or otherwise optimize storage across all folders.
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Chapter 3
Design of the DATS System1
DATS ensures that untrusted applications cannot mix information across
folders by executing a unique web-application instance for each folder. In this
section, we describe how DATS enables untrusted applications to implement
cross-folder views and storage without breaking this folder non-interference
policy. We also describe hardware-assisted OS containers that help reduce the
overhead of multi-execution in DATS. We begin in Figure 2.1 with a typical
user workflow and walk through the key steps in the lifecycle of an application
on DATS.
A user begins by visiting the DATS Desktop (§ 3.2). Here, DATS
exposes Data objects (called folders) to users, similar to platforms like Google
Drive, Box, or Dropbox. Users express their confidentiality policies (i.e. who
can access which folders) using simple per-folder ACLs. Every folder can hold
arbitrary data, making them independent of application-specific constructs
1Casen Hunger, Llùıs Vilanova, Charalampos Papamanthou, Yoav Etsion, and Mohit
Tiwari. DATS – data containers for web applications. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third
International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operat-
ing Systems, ASPLOS ’18, pages 722-736, New York, NY, USA, 2018. ACM. The author’s
contributions include assisting with the research design, writing software, performing exper-
iments, and writing of the publication.
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like messages, documents, medical records, etc. DATS enforces folder-level
ACLs on untrusted third-party applications that attach to users’ Drive/Box
accounts. Folders are color-coded in the figure (green, red, and blue) to easily
track information flow across the system. DATS implements users, folders,
and folder ACLs. Thus, applications need not implement further ACL rules.
After managing their ACLs, a user selects an application and launches
its landing page A . On this page, users can set the application’s preferences
used across all their folders, like profile pictures, since this data is made explic-
itly public to all folders. We term this as a non-folder view. From this page, a
user can trigger a cross-folder view of information B , like a list of upcoming
appointments. The user can then click on a specific appointment to load its
per-folder view C and get or set additional information. From here, a user
can move between cross-folder (appointment list) and per-folder (appointment
information) views.
We will now describe the server-side actions using the same workflow.
First, DATS starts an application in a non-folder container ( 1 ), which can-
not access user data from any folder (only sees the user’s public settings and
application resources). DATS uses this container to create cross-folder views
(2a and 2b leading to B ) and then sets up per-folder containers in 3 as the
user traverses links out of cross-folder into per-folder views. We now describe
the developer’s view of application components on DATS.
App components contain entire (untrusted) applications and are instan-
tiated multiple times. Each instance runs in an OS-level container [15, 39, 40]
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(app row in Figure 2.1) with a trivial data-centric MAC policy: it has exclu-
sive access to a single folder and no other external resources. Containers get a
standard system view, including system calls, libraries, and runtimes for any
development framework and also extend to the client browser. This is key for
programmability given the diversity in toolkits and languages for developing
applications.
This “data container” approach, however, forbids cross-folder function-
ality, breaking the usability and efficiency of most applications. DATS thus
provides two robust declassification [11] mechanisms for cross-folder function-
ality, ensuring that untrusted code cannot affect declassified data.
Template files describe how to aggregate information from multi-
ple folders into a single cross-folder view, making applications usable. The
template in Figure 2.1 is provided by the non-folder app in 2a . A trusted
Template Declassifier inflates templates with data from each per-folder app
instance ( 2b ) through a simple form of PL-level IFC: it generates HTML/JS
by processing only one data element at a time, and each output (e.g. link)
can only send information back to the app instance that produced it (e.g. 3 ).
Storage services (untrusted storage row in Figure 2.1) implement
the application’s cross-folder models to make storage efficient. DATS inter-
poses a trusted Storage Declassifier on the app–storage communication. The
Storage Declassifier uses integrity checking to ensure that each response value
of a “get(key)” request from a folder is the same as the last “put(key,
value)” for that folder. Interestingly, integrity checking the put-get inter-
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face and confining the storage services in a container enables these untrusted
services to work with plain-text data.
We will now discuss the security invariants in DATS (§ 3.1) followed
by details about each component (§§ 3.2 to 3.6).
3.1 Security Invariants in DATS
DATS guarantees end-to-end folder non-interference, covering apps and
information flow-secure views and storage. Each app instance runs in a con-
fined container – conceptually, each container covers server and client devices
– with access to only one folder. This ensures baseline folder non-interference
for app instances.
DATS’s Template Declassifier inflates untrusted templates from the
application with untrusted results from many folders to construct a view, but
ensures that communication from the view back to an app instance only uses
data from that same instance. The Template Declassifier prevents explicit
information flows by ensuring each HTML element that can send a request
(e.g. a link) contains information from at most one folder and points to the
app instance that has access to it. It also prevents implicit information flows by
using a template language that does not allow predicates or conditional loops
over results from different folders. Fortunately, view templating languages are
already moving towards such restrictions to minimize business logic inside the
presentation layer [41].
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DATS’s Storage Declassifier ensures that a get value returned to an app
equals that last value that was put by the app – hence, the untrusted storage
service can operate on plain-text data across folders and yet be prevented from
breaking folder non-interference. Integrity checking in Storage Declassifier not
only prevents storage from explicitly copying Alice’s data into a get response
for Bob, but also prevents implicit leaks where storage returns Bob’s value
X if Alice’s secret bit is 0 and Bob’s value Y if Alice’s bit is 1. storage is
confined to a container with no outputs other than to the Storage Declassifier ,
assuming that timing/termination channels from storage to app are addressed
using complementary techniques (see § 2.1). DATS’s Storage Declassifier and
confinement together demonstrate a novel method of using an authenticated
storage interface to enforce non-interference.
DATS’s guarantees rely on a few fundamental primitives: containers on
server and client, IFC in the Template Declassifier , and integrity checking in
the Storage Declassifier . The Template Declassifier and Storage Declassifier
provide robust declassification [11] for cross-folder functionality – i.e., guaran-
tee that untrusted code or data in a folder cannot affect messages/data that
is sent from a cross-folder container back to a different per-folder container.
DATS extends containers into the client browser by using one sub-
domain per app instance (browser origin in Figure 2.1). DATS then acti-
vates the Same-Origin Policy (SOP) and Content Security Policy (CSP) on
the client browser to limit access to remote resources and confine untrusted
client-side code (e.g. JavaScript) within each sub-domain (container). DATS
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also drops all cookies set for parent domains. Containers on the server can
be implemented directly as reference monitors (e.g., SELinux or LXC), with
capabilities, or with information flow control – DATS deployers can pick one
based on performance and compatibility constraints.
Components interact with DATS abstractions using an authenticated
RESTful interface. Therefore, trusted components are no different than the
untrusted ones, except that they are authorized to perform operations such as
user authentication. Internally, each container is identified by the application
it is running (e.g. Health), the user it is running for (e.g. Dave), and the folder
it has access to (e.g. “Fracture”). As used throughout this section, the green
container in Figure 2.1 would be identified as <Health, Dave, Fracture>.
3.2 Data Object and User Management
DATS provides users with two trusted user interface (TUI) applications
– Login authenticates and manages users, and the Desktop allows users to
create, delete, and share folders and launch untrusted applications. Access
control over folders lets users control the granularity at which their data is
shared. A user may wish to assign a single medical encounter to a folder,
allowing them to share each of their encounters individually, or a user may
wish to place all their encounters within a single folder, allowing them to
share their entire medical history at once. While users determine how much
is shared, developers control the minimum unit of sharing.
DATS provides two services to retain application functionality after
19



















(b) Per-folder JSON data









Figure 3.1: A cross-folder template and an example expansion from the DATS
Health application. DATS keywords are black and bold and DATS Health’s per-
folder data is highlighted in red. Some of the HTML has been omitted for brevity.
removing access-control and authentication: app instances contact the User
Service to see which users have access to their current folder, and the Template
Declassifier uses templates to create cross-folder views (§ 3.4).
DATS provides the User Service because applications work with the
‘user’ abstraction for a large portion of their functionality, in addition to ac-
cess control, and removing the concept of users from applications only works
for the simplest of applications. For instance, Mattermost (see § 5.1) has 92
different SQL queries involving its user table, some of which are complex and
include joins across multiple different tables. The User Service eases appli-
cation development by allowing per-folder app instances to read information
about the users who have access to the apps’ folder and to trigger notifications




The app components contain most of the application logic and are
run within containers. They communicate with client browsers through the
trusted DATS Proxy (not shown in Figure 2.1 for clarity). The Proxy routes
traffic between the sub-domains used by client browsers and the app instances
(i.e. containers) on the server. Non-folder and per-folder functionality are the
most common ( 1 and 3 ) and can have native performance (DATS acts as a
reverse proxy between the client browser and app instances).
The Proxy extends containers to the client side to enforce indirect folder
non-interference: it activates the browser’s SOP and CSP and drops cookies
for parent domains (see § 3.1). Every time an app is instantiated it is assigned
a new random sub-domain. For example, DATS maps the non-folder view in
A of Figure 2.1 to the app instance <Health, Dave> ( 1 , without access to
any folder), and the per-folder view in C to the instance <Health, Dave,
Fracture> ( 3 , with access to folder “Fracture”); the cross-folder view in B
also has its own sub-domain, but its contents are served directly by the Proxy
(see § 3.4).
DATS has a trusted Container Manager that can be instantiated in
multiple nodes to scale horizontally. It enforces direct folder non-interference
by creating mutually isolated containers: each container is assigned an IP and
port to listen for requests and only has access to its assigned folder (if any, since
non-folder app instances cannot access any folder) and to DATS’s public API
(see § 3.6). To avoid the latency costs of spinning up containers on-demand,
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the Container Manager uses container reuse, pooling, and prefetching.
3.3.1 Hardware-Accelerated Thread Containers
By default, DATS uses OS-level containers [15, 39, 40] to enforce isola-
tion (such as LXC and SELinux as described in § 4.1) and make applications
programmable (developers can pick from many application stacks in existence
today). Nonetheless, using multiple app instances has inherent multi-execution
overheads [13], which are especially acute when a cross-folder view, such as
search, requires streaming through all folders that a user has access to. Clearly,
such large sweeping operations will put container startup and network setup
latencies in the critical path of a view query.
To address this slowdown, we have designed thread-level containers
in DATS. We use SELinux [16] and fine-grained capability-based architec-
tures [17, 42] to build “thread containers” so that the DATS Proxy and app
code can execute in the same process. This allows the Proxy to trigger a large
number of thread containers – one app runs in each thread and performs the
query (e.g. search) over data in one folder. §§ 4.1 and 7.2 describe our im-
plementation of hardware-assisted thread containers, even though one could
also use a DIFC architecture like Raksha [43] or Loki [44] instead (where each
folder would be a mutually unordered label in the policy lattice). Interestingly,
thread containers are in line with event-triggered plugins used on a web server
frontend (e.g. WSGI [45]).
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3.4 Template Components
Cross-folder views retain critical functionality to make applications us-
able, but must maintain folder non-interference. Templates compose views
declaratively with information from multiple folders without executing any
untrusted code. Developers can use any static resource in cross-folder views
along with some trusted JavaScript provided by DATS.
Templates are written in a simple language, like views in many existing
MVC web applications [12]. They are based on the stateless Mustache lan-
guage [41] (without explicit control-flow operations like loops), making it easy
to apply IFC to ensure folder non-interference2: each element in B contains
information from at most one folder and can only send a request to the app
instance that provided that information (e.g. URLs for images, links and
forms).
The Template Declassifier forbids arbitrary JavaScript in templates,
since current browsers do not provide IFC on client-side code (e.g. unlike
COWL [47]). Instead, the Template Declassifier recognizes additional tags
that expand to trusted snippets of JavaScript for searching, sorting and auto-
completing elements (see Table 3.1). Such tags can also be used to generate
scripts that integrate differential privacy databases like PINQ [26] into a DATS
application.
2 The same approach could also be applied to any application generating user-facing views
(e.g. using Android layout templates). A purposely simple templating language side-steps
the precision vs. soundness problems of applying IFC to full-featured languages [37,46].
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In practice, we found that a most application functionality lies in non-
folder and per-folder views (and can therefore include arbitrary JavaScript).
Also, programmers can use their own templating language to produce a valid
template.
3.4.1 Cross-Folder View Example
This section explains the steps involved in using a cross-folder view for
the examples in Figures 2.1 and 3.1.
First, the user clicks the “Appointments” link A in their browser and
an HTTPS request for /view is sent to the Proxy . The Proxy determines
the app instance to forward the request to based on the request’s sub-domain.
The non-folder application responds with a template 2a (Figure 3.1a) and
triggers a view of data across all folders by setting the x-dats-crossfolder
header field.
The Proxy redirects the client to a new temporary sub-domain B while
it constructs the cross-folder view. The Proxy creates (or reuses) an app
instance for each of a user’s folders and replays the /view request to each of
them. Each per-folder app instance responds to the request with a JSON list
(Figure 3.1b). The DATS API informs App instances if they are executing in
non-folder or per-folder mode so that logic on the “shared” /view endpoint
can change accordingly.
The Template Declassifier collects the per-folder results and uses them
to inflate the template ( 2b ). The template’s top-level tag, DATS.results
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(Figure 3.1a; there can be many, but not nested), is inflated with each per-
folder result in turn (Figure 3.1b). The result is served by the Proxy as the
cross-folder view in B .
URLs in inflated regions need to use the DATS.enter tag or an error
is returned. The tag adds a random prefix (tracked by the Proxy ; see below)
to URLs. Programmers can use their own tags to reference per-folder infor-
mation inside a DATS.results block (e.g. red tags for events and title in
Figures 3.1a and 3.1b).
The Proxy redirects a request for /home in Figure 3.1c (or any other
resource outside the DATS.results region; outer orange region with horizontal
stripes in B ) to the sub-domain for the non-folder app instance (i.e. that
serving A ). A request for /random3/view?Fracture (or any resource created
with DATS.enter; inner folder-colored regions in B ) is instead redirected to
the sub-domain for the corresponding per-folder app instance (i.e. that serving
C , by stripping the random3 prefix to get the endpoint /view?Fracture that
3 will serve).
3.4.2 Non-Secure Alternatives
The intuitive solution to creating cross-folder views based on OS-level
IFC would be to create an app instance with read-only access to all folders.
This folder will acquire the highest secrecy label and cannot let users click on
links in views (e.g., an inbox) to go to a message in a folder. This is because




/users Get per-folder user info.
Proxy
/port Connect to a storage service.
Application
/dats/start Send folder and user info to apps.
/dats/update Send updated user info to apps.
/dats/quit Apps return from per-folder view.
Template
DATS.results Inflate region with per-folder info.
DATS.enter Create per-folder URL.
DATS.search Trusted JS for searching tags.
DATS.sort Trusted JS for sorting by tags.
DATS.autocomplete Trusted JS for autocomplete by tags.
Table 3.1: DATS Public API. User Service, Proxy, and Template endpoints are
implemented by DATS. Application endpoints are implemented by untrusted apps.
container for folder “Fever” (e.g. to edit an appointment there) and violate
folder non-interference. Alternatively, one could whitelist specific URLs and
the data sent through each URL to prevent explicit leaks as above. In this case,
a malicious app can create an implicit leak by picking white-listed message A
vs. message B to indicate 0 vs. 1 – the view component in DATS fundamentally
requires information flow control inside a container. We emphasize that DATS
could have used any language with information flow control for templates –
we picked a logicless templating language since software engineering practices
simplify the Template Declassifier ’s task.
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Figure 3.2: Implementation of DATS; colors and gray denote untrusted code and
italics show the mechanisms used. All DATS components run in containers. The
TUI application is not shown for brevity.
3.5 Storage Services
Storage services increase application efficiency by running untrusted
functionality on plain-text across folders (i.e. cross-folder storage services or
models in an MVC application). Efficiency can be in terms of storage space
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(e.g. cross-folder data deduplication) or other resources (e.g. using a single
service instance to avoid multi-execution [13]).
DATS isolates storage services inside a container, and app instances
must use the Proxy ’s /port endpoint to request access to storage instances. It
returns a connection to a transparent trusted Storage Declassifier (also inside
a container) interposed to the storage service to ensure that it cannot take
data from one folder and output it to another folder’s app component. Storage
Declassifiers associate the requesting app’s IP to their assigned folder.
Many popular applications have models using (variants of) put–get in-
terfaces, where integrity checks are sufficient to ensure non-interference. The
declassifier checks that a “get(key)” request returns the most recent value for
“put(key, value)” (otherwise aborts the connection). The same approach
can be transparently applied to other interfaces, like disk blocks or file sys-
tems [48].
Finally, many large code-bases use trusted databases that have already
gone through extensive audits (e.g. trusted developers assign roles to imple-
ment access policies). In this case, the declassifier creates per-folder databases
on a single storage instance and uses the existing access control mechanisms
to limit each app instance to its corresponding folder’s data. The database
should maintain data integrity, but that is not a requirement (e.g. Inte-
griDB [49]).
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3.6 Application Instance Lifecycle and APIs
Table 3.1 summarizes the API available to untrusted components whose
lifecycle is managed by the Proxy . Even if not shown in the figures for clar-
ity, all containers have read-only access to a folder that contains their code.
Non-folder containers also have read-write access to a folder that can be used
to store user-specific settings, and per-folder containers get read-only access
to it (ensuring folder non-interference). Per-folder instances cannot directly
link back to a non-folder or cross-folder view since that could be used to ex-
filtrate information across folders. Instead, the Proxy intercepts requests to
/dats/quit and redirects the client to the cross-folder view that initiated a
transition to that per-folder view.
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Chapter 4
Implementation of the DATS System1
Figure 3.2 shows all the components described in Chapter 3 and how
they interact, with an emphasis on DATS’s TCB. It includes four Storage De-
classifiers we wrote for MySQL, MongoDB, Redis, and a custom deduplication
backend. We wrote 13 K lines of TCB code in Python, Node.js, and C. The
TCB can be substantially reduced by running containers on security-oriented
OSs like seL4 [50] or HiStar [8]. Instead of trusting the hypervisor, we could
also use attestation and trusted boot [51,52] to bootstrap DATS on a remote
cloud.
MongoDB and Redis are not limited to put/get, but we find this suffi-
cient for our diverse applications (see Chapter 5). Also, app programmers can
always use a per-folder instance of their storage service.
The Proxy is a multi-process Flask [53] application running behind
Apache with MySQL as a persistent database, Redis [54] as a short-term
1Casen Hunger, Llùıs Vilanova, Charalampos Papamanthou, Yoav Etsion, and Mohit
Tiwari. DATS – data containers for web applications. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third
International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operat-
ing Systems, ASPLOS ’18, pages 722-736, New York, NY, USA, 2018. ACM. The author’s
contributions include assisting with the research design, writing software, performing exper-
iments, and writing of the publication.
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database and for distributed locks, and Celery [55] to run cross-folder requests
in parallel. API operations are authorized by inspecting the requestor’s IP;
this is the simplest mechanism that can monitor folder access grants (each
container has a unique IP).
The Proxy authorizes access to container sub-domains using a session
cookie set by the trusted Login application and also performs a simple form of
caching of the per-folder JSON results used to feed templates. The caching
API is not described due to space constraints, but follows concepts similar to
existing web caching technologies.
4.1 Container Backends
Off-the-Shelf Container Techniques. LinuX Containers (LXC) [15]
provide lightweight OS virtualization; we did not try conventional VMs since
LXC is more efficient [56, 57]. Containers are created as a “clone” of a base
file-system with additional folders overlaid on top using AUFS [58] and are
isolated at the network level using iptables.
SELinux [16, 59] implements flexible and fine-grained MAC for Linux.
Each container gets a virtual network interface and a binary policy module
with the necessary labels to access files and network ports.
HW-Capabilities Based Thread Containers. When a
Proxy thread “enters” a container (executes a per-folder request using the
app code), we prevent it from sharing memory with other threads using the
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CODOMs capability architecture [18]. The app code is loaded into a separate
CODOMs protection domain that isolated threads have read and execute ac-
cess to. Each thread gets a read-only capability pointing to its input request
and two read-write capabilities that point to their private stack and heap pool,
respectively. To prevent sharing through the file system, we added a Linux
system call (used by the Proxy) that privatizes the thread’s file descriptor ta-
ble and SELinux label. When a thread returns from its app call, the Proxy
restores the per-process file descriptor table and SELinux tag, and frees the
thread’s private memory pages (the private heap and stack).
4.2 Enforcing Client-Side Non-Interference
DATS uses the Template Declassifier and standardized browser security
controls (configured by the Proxy on the headers of the responses it serves to
the client) to avoid:
Leaks through request URLs/contents. The trusted Template
Declassifier knows the HTML structure and semantics of tags that trigger
browser requests (e.g. links and forms) and include untrusted client-side
code (forbidden in cross-folder views). Each tag includes information from
a single DATS.results block, ensuring that request URLs and contents have
information from a single folder (i.e. a <form> block cannot span across
multiple DATS.results blocks). Also, all URLs inside a DATS.results block
are generated with a DATS.enter block — making sure the URLs cannot leak
per-folder data through a request to another container.
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DATS sets the browser’s CSP to only allow trusted client-side code in
cross-folder views (otherwise untrusted code could observe and modify a view
to leak information).
Leaks through request headers. DATS’s Proxy drops cookies set
by untrusted app responses for any origin not assigned to that app instance/-
container (i.e. drops cookies for parent domains). The browser’s CSP (and
the newer “Referrer-Policy”) ensures no data is leaked through the “Referrer”
header (i.e. each view type is on a different origin).
Leaks to third-party domains. The browsers SOP forbids client-
side code to access other non-origin domains.
Leaks through URL guessing. Randomizing container sub-domains
ensures apps cannot exfiltrate information by generating a link or redirecting




Developers can write or port applications to DATS without any secu-
rity expertise, since authentication and access control are offloaded to DATS.
Instead, they need only to make functionality-based decisions: establishing
a minimum unit of sharing (§ 3.2), writing templates for cross-folder views
(§ 3.4), and deciding what storage services to use (if any; § 3.5). We evaluate
programmability in DATS by porting 4 open-source applications and writing
4 applications from scratch, all summarized in Table 5.1. They cover diverse
use-cases, like messaging, voice/video chats, document editing, software devel-
opment, and electronic medical records.
We describe Mattermost and DATS Health in detail since they stress
user management and template creation tasks.
1Casen Hunger, Llùıs Vilanova, Charalampos Papamanthou, Yoav Etsion, and Mohit
Tiwari. DATS – data containers for web applications. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third
International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operat-
ing Systems, ASPLOS ’18, pages 722-736, New York, NY, USA, 2018. ACM. The author’s
contributions include assisting with the research design, writing software, performing exper-
iments, and writing of the publication.
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Table 5.1: DATS Effort: lines of code (LOC) to make an application DATS-aware.
Total TCB: LOC of just application code (left) and including all its dependencies
(right). CVEs: public CVEs since 2013 [60] for the application (left) and entire ap-
plication stack (right). CVE w/ Leak: CVEs which contain information disclosures
for the application (left) and entire stack (right). With DATS, the entire application
SW stack is outside the TCB and folder interference is systematically eliminated.
(*): CVE information not available. ( A): Application code. ( T): template con-
tents. ( P): Use of DATS’s APIs.
35
5.1 Mattermost
Mattermost (version 3.7) is a messaging application written using Go
(server side), React [61] (client side), and MySQL for storage. It has the
concepts of teams (user groups) and channels to organize conversations based
on similar topics.
We selected channels as the minimum unit of sharing, since they are a
natural choice. A user can thus choose to create multiple teams and channels
on a single folder or use only one channel per folder from the DATS TUI. The
developer only provides the functionality of channels and teams as a way to
organize data without tying it to access control (see § 3.2).
5.1.1 Cross-Folder Views
Mattermost by default lacks the ability view a single unified “inbox” of
messages across all teams (the user has to enter a team and channel to view
messages). We wrote a new landing page with a template (140 lines of HTML,
application tags, and DATS tags) that displays a timeline of recent activity
across all teams. The template includes application-specific tags (e.g. Teams)
embedded within the DATS.results block. The per-folder request returns
a JSON list with the teams, channels, and most recent messages for each
channel stored on that folder. The template also uses the DATS.enter tag
on each message to link it to a per-folder app instance that will show the full
conversation.
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5.1.2 User Authentication and Access Control
We removed user authentication from Mattermost and instead use the
User Service to have an up-to-date per-folder “Users” table (we added end-
points /dats/start and
/dats/update; see § 3.6). This is crucial to Mattermost: e.g. it displays a
list of recent activity for a particular team by issuing an SQL join query with
its “Users”, “TeamMembers”, and “Status” tables.
5.2 DATS Health
DATS Health is an MVC application written from scratch by under-
graduate students. It allows doctors and patients to manage medical records
(each medical visit is an “encounter”) and allows users to schedule appoint-
ments through three different calendar views (month, week, and day). En-
counters were selected as the minimum unit of sharing. Unlike Mattermost,
calendar views in DATS Health require an extensive use of templates (end-
points /month?<value>, /week?<value> and /day?<value>).
Figure 5.1 shows an example of how we constructed the (non-folder)
template and the (per-folder) JSON results for the /month endpoint (the
other two work in a similar way). The template contains an empty grid with
non-event information, such as month name and dates for each cell. Each
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Figure 5.1: Snippet from the DATS Health calendar template page. Template
tags (left) are matched with the per-folder JSON (right) and inflated to create the
calendar information.
The JSON results are pulled from a MongoDB database and returned
when a per-folder app instance receives a request to the same /month endpoint.
Each event is embedded in the EventList array in one of three types of tags.
The first one is a list of all events for the actual date (e.g. 2-1-2017). The
other two tags are for weekly (e.g. repeatsMonday, repeatsTuesday) and
monthly events (e.g. repeatsOnTheFirst, repeatsOnTheSecond).
The Template Declassifier goes through each DATS.results block and
iterates across each per-folder result (EventList). Any event with a match-
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ing template tag (2-1-2017, repeatsWednesday, and repeatsOnTheFirst in
Figure 5.1) is then inserted into the template.
The repeats... tags are crucial to avoid producing large JSON results
where an event must contain a key for every date it should be displayed on (up
to 365 entries per event per year). Additionally, they allow for JSON result




DATS mitigates all data-disclosure vulnerabilities by refactoring au-
thorization and access control out of untrusted web applications (i.e. moving
applications outside the TCB). Table 5.1 summarizes the total number of vul-
nerabilities found in the applications and their third-party dependencies that
we have run on DATS. Unprevented vulnerabilities include broken function-
ality that does not produce information disclosures, such as unauthenticated
team creation in Mattermost2. We will now discuss vulnerabilities found in
Mattermost and Gitlab to understand their root causes and how DATS pre-
vents them.
Mattermost has disclosed 42 vulnerabilities since 2015 [62], 19 of which
DATS would prevent. They include cross-site scripting, remote code execution,
denial-of-service, message spoofing, and authentication bypassing. The major-
1Casen Hunger, Llùıs Vilanova, Charalampos Papamanthou, Yoav Etsion, and Mohit
Tiwari. DATS – data containers for web applications. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third
International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operat-
ing Systems, ASPLOS ’18, pages 722-736, New York, NY, USA, 2018. ACM. The author’s
contributions include assisting with the research design, writing software, performing exper-
iments, and writing of the publication.
2The data we collected for this evaluation can be found in https://bitbucket.org/
datsplatform/security-evaluation.
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ity stem from missed access-control checks and incorrect input sanitation. For
example, a missed authorization check in /api/v1/users/find teams allowed
attackers to view the invite link for any team on the system, provided that
they knew the email of any user on the team.
We also examined the 13 CVEs (9 preventable by DATS) disclosed for
Gitlab and discovered similar vulnerabilities. For example, Gitlab improperly
sanitizes public keys uploaded by users before operating with them, allowing
attackers to execute arbitrary code on a Gitlab server [63].
DATS prevents these improper data disclosures because each applica-
tion instance is confined to its own folder, and user authorization is centralized
in the TCB. Vulnerabilities can appear in application code, but also in the large
stacks of third-party code used by web applications. In total, 402 CVEs have
been reported for the stacks of the applications found here, of which 237 would
be prevented by DATS.
Interestingly, DATS is also able to contain app-layer denial of service
(DOS) attacks; we can apply per-container resource limits (e.g. using cgroups
in Linux) to contain attacks to a per-user and folder instance. For example,
incorrect sanitization in large file uploads allowed for a server-side DOS attack
in Mattermost, consuming too much memory within the application. Simi-





We built DATS using two container technologies and show that HW-
assisted containers improve performance. We find that DATS provides rea-
sonable performance for the majority of application operations (per-folder re-
quests) and good scalability for cross-folder operations (albeit with a fixed
latency cost due to multi-execution § 7.1.2). For worst case operations (search-
ing across all folders), a naive implementation introduces overheads of 70× (13
secs) while hardware assisted solutions brings this down to 1.47× (47 msecs).
All experiments use an Intel Core i7-4770 (4 cores 2-way SMT @ 3.40GHz),
12 GB DDR3, an Intel 82574L NIC (1 Gbit), a Seagate ST3500413AS disk
(500 GB, 7200 rpm, 16 MB cache) and Ubuntu server 14.04 LTS.
1Casen Hunger, Llùıs Vilanova, Charalampos Papamanthou, Yoav Etsion, and Mohit
Tiwari. DATS – data containers for web applications. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third
International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operat-
ing Systems, ASPLOS ’18, pages 722-736, New York, NY, USA, 2018. ACM. The author’s
contributions include assisting with the research design, writing software, performing exper-
iments, and writing of the publication.
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7.1 Existing Container Technologies
Container latency is encountered when creating containers, starting
applications inside containers, and destroying containers. Starting an LXC or
SELinux container along with the application inside ranges from about 1second
(e.g. DATS Health) to tens of seconds (e.g. Mattermost). The Container
Manager maintains a pool of free containers and prefetches them, hence none
of these operations are on the critical path.
7.1.1 Per-Folder Throughput and Latency
We measured the average throughput and latency for a per-folder re-
quest to DATS Health (§ 5.2) with varying number of clients – using a low-
overhead query to access a single encounter to focus on DATS’s overheads.
The baseline application (one process per client) is compared against a ver-
sion running in DATS using either the LXC or SELinux backends, both with
and without a shared MongoDB storage service.
We find that all experiments have a pareto-optimal point at 8 clients,
with latency overhead of 3× (10 msec) and throughput overhead of 66% (1000 req/sec).
DATS’s scaling is limited due to its Proxy component since it routes all re-
quests to app containers – a dynamic reverse proxy (for client authentication
and routing to the target container) would greatly improve latency, contact-
ing the Proxy only when a cross-folder operation is triggered. Throughput
would improve by moving reference counting (now serialized in Redis) to a
distributed algorithm with batched lazy releases. Latency and throughput
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would also improve with simple page caching.
7.1.2 Cross-Folder Throughput and Latency
We also measured the latency of a worst-case cross-folder request with
an increasing number of folders (same configurations and disabling the JSON
result caching from Chapter 4).
DATS shows a base overhead of 30× (from 0.01 to 0.3 sec latency)
due to container-agnostic factors: (1) the latency overheads in § 7.1.1; (2)
the additional redirects for cross-folder views (§ 3.4); and (3) a sub-optimal
Template Declassifier using Python libraries. The folder count has a small
linear increase in latency overheads (up to 1 sec for 50 folders). This is inherent
to the multi-execution of existing containers (each per-folder request needs a
separate process), and storage consolidation shows a slight improvement on
that.
DATS thus has reasonable folder scalability — container reuse and
prefetching and running per-folder requests in parallel effectively hides costs.
The base overhead can be eliminated using known optimizations (§ 7.1.1) and
a faster Template Declassifier implementation.
7.1.3 Cross-Folder Storage Declassifier
We also analyzed the latency overheads of using a Storage Declassi-
fier with our deduplication storage (Chapter 4). The declassifier adds a 2×
and 3× latency overhead for get and put operations, respectively. This is
expected given our simple prototype (150 LOC of Python), but shows ease of
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implementation. More efficiency is possible through data blocking and using
Merkle trees [48] for integrity checking.
7.2 Hardware-Accelerated Containers
Cross-folder operations are critical in DATS and existing container
technologies bring intrinsic overheads: the multi-execution of per-folder pro-
cesses [13] and copying data across them. We find that hardware-accelerated
thread containers (§§ 3.3 and 4.1) help eliminate these overheads while even
existing containerization technologies have negligible overheads for large ap-
plication workloads.
Figure 7.1 shows the performance of a cross-folder operation with 800
folders using 8 threads.The X-axis shows the workload necessary to make over-
heads negligible — each request calculates the factorial of the X-axis number
(stored in a per-folder file, opened and closed on each request). The Y-axis is
normalized to the regular non-isolated threads. We ran the experiments na-
tively, using the same methodology of previous studies with CODOMs [64]2.
Secure baseline shows the most efficient existing container technology
with perfect Proxy scalability and SELinux label prefetching, where app and
Proxy communicate through a pipe. Slowdowns range from more than 70x to
1.47x. Ported applications see the highest overhead; the workload in § 7.1.2
corresponds to the vertical line in Figure 7.1.
2Capability operations are emulated using regular memory accesses, and hardware reg-
isters are emulated using thread-local variables.
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(↓ lower is better)
Slowdown vs. unsecure shared library [×]
Secure baseline (faster than base DATS)
Thread containers (replicated)
Thread containers (replicated, preloaded)
Thread containers (shared)
Figure 7.1: Performance of a cross-folder operation with hardware-accelerated
thread containers, normalized to the performance of an unsecure shared library.
The Y-axis shows the normalized number of non-isolated threads while the X-axis
shows the processing work on each folder. The unsecure baseline goes from 47 to
13,721 msec, and generating a cross-folder result for § 7.1.2 corresponds to the thin
vertical line.
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Thread container (replicated) shows the costs of running a thread
container with a regular app instance; the Proxy uses dlopen/dlclose when
entering/exiting the container, respectively. The slowdowns are drastically
reduced to 12.25x–1.01x because of less expensive thread containers and by
avoiding copies between the Proxy and the app.
Thread container (replicated, preloaded) decouples the multi-
execution overheads from library management by optimistically preloading all
app instances and never unloading them. Slowdowns are 3.76x–1.01x, since
multi-execution still affects performance; having multiple virtual copies of a
library does not allow optimal sharing of read-only and micro-architectural
state.
Thread container (shared) shows the best results by sharing a sin-
gle read-only app instance across thread containers. It removes the overheads
of multi-execution and managing per-container library instances, reducing
slowdowns to 3.65x–0.98x, but global writable data must be replaced with
dynamic allocations.
Thus, hardware-acceleration reduces overheads from 70x to 3.65x




Hardware-assisted reference monitors (e.g. Intel MPX, SGX)
[65,66], capability-based [18,35,50,67], information flow tracking [8,9,43], and
other systems [68] can be used to implement containers. On the client side,
data-confined sandboxes and IFC [47, 69] can improve DATS’s security guar-
antees and template flexibility. Verifiable SQL queries such as IntegriDB [49]
can be integrated as Storage Declassifiers , moving SQL DBs outside the TCB.
PL-level IFC solutions (Jeeves [14], Fabric [70], Aeolus [71], Jif [37])
allow for dynamic, fine-grained IFC abilities, but often require developers to
understand information flow policies or limit choices to supported languages.
These solutions are good candidates for writing DATS trusted components.
Other solutions segment data and applications along the user axis. Ra-
diatus [72] runs applications inside user containers – collaborative containers
will require DATS-like templates and a Storage Declassifier . Radiatus’s ca-
1Casen Hunger, Llùıs Vilanova, Charalampos Papamanthou, Yoav Etsion, and Mohit
Tiwari. DATS – data containers for web applications. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third
International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operat-
ing Systems, ASPLOS ’18, pages 722-736, New York, NY, USA, 2018. ACM. The author’s
contributions include assisting with the research design, writing software, performing exper-
iments, and writing of the publication.
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pability protocol requires applications to be ported to access per-user data,
similar to our API. It also trusts third-party storage services to maintain data
separation between per-user privacy domains. Similarly, CLAMP [73] repli-
cates a WebStack per-user with two security-critical pieces: a query restrictor
(which guards a database) and a dispatcher (which authenticates the user).
CLAMP does not enable controlled sharing of user data with untrusted code.
πBox [33] containerizes per-user applications and uses a differential privacy
declassifier for ad-impressions.
Lastly, similar solutions provide segmentation at the data-object level.
Hails [10] lets developers associate access control policies to the model, while
replicating view and controller components for each security label. Appli-
cations are written in Haskell and developers have to label their models (or
platform administrators have to understand each application’s models), and
cross-label (i.e. cross-folder) views or storage services like deduplication will
require extending Hails with our robust declassifiers.
Earp [74] allows users to share app-specific data objects (e.g., a custom
animation inside an album) but requires developers to implement schema-level
permissions (like Hails’ MPVC framework). DATS’s model is more appropriate
when users wish to run multiple apps for data with identical access controls
(e.g., messages, photos, and docs in a project).
Secure multi-execution [75] provides non-interfering data containers for
client-side code (one process per container, although faceted execution can
relax that [76]). Self-protecting data [77] uses hardware IFC and a security
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policy component that does not protect against implicit information flows.
Maxoid [78] allows an app to give its sensitive data to an untrusted
app while confining the untrusted app to not further leak the data. This
functionality is equivalent to DATS’s app component and similar to Hails
plugins.
The IFC approaches above implement containers in different ways.
DATS’s declassification is applicable to all – it will safely remove declassi-





DATS places applications out of the TCB while presenting a familiar
security-oblivious programming model to developers. Extracting out access
control from web services and enforcing it as a service is a major departure
from current application-centric security models, but this is only one step
forward towards placing users in control over their data. DATS motivates
focusing language support for non-interference specifically towards template
languages and architecture/OS support for multi-execution. In its current
state, DATS is evidence that user privacy and developer productivity are not
a zero-sum game.
1Casen Hunger, Llùıs Vilanova, Charalampos Papamanthou, Yoav Etsion, and Mohit
Tiwari. DATS – data containers for web applications. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third
International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operat-
ing Systems, ASPLOS ’18, pages 722-736, New York, NY, USA, 2018. ACM. The author’s
contributions include assisting with the research design, writing software, performing exper-
iments, and writing of the publication.
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Acronyms
ACL access control list.
CSP Content Security Policy.
IFC information flow control.
LOC lines of code.
MAC mandatory access control.
MVC model-view-controller.
SOP Same-Origin Policy.
TCB trusted computing base.
TUI trusted user interface.
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